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1. About the different models of protection of constitutionality and legality 
 
The Constitutional Court is a separate body that serves as a watchdog of the 
constitution in a given country, and as a protector of the constitutionality, legality, and the 
citizens' freedoms and rights within the national legal system.  
From an organisational point of view, there are several models of constitutionality that 
can be determined, as follows: 
 
1. American model based on the Marbery vs. Madison case (Marbery vs. 
Madison, 1803), and, in accordance with the John Marshal doctrine, according to whom the 
constitutional issues are subject of interest and resolution of all courts that are under the scope 
of the regular judiciary (in an environment of decentralised, widespread of dispersed control 
procedure), and based on organisational  procedure that is typical for the regular judiciary 
(incidenter). And while the American model with widespread system of protection of 
constitutionality gives the authority to all courts to assess the constitutionality of the laws, the 
European  model concentrates all the power for the assessment of the constitutionality on one 
body. In Europe, there are number of countries that have accepted the American model, such 
as Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and in North America, besides the U.S., this 
model is also applied in Canada, as well as, on the African continent, in Botswana, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya and other countries.2  
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2. The new (British model) of the Commonwealth.   This model cannot be classified 
neither as American, nor as European. Typical for this model is that the procedure for 
protection of constitutionality and legality lies with the highest court in the country composed 
of regular judges who are not politically nominated. By default, this model in largest 
proportion executes preventive control of the constitutionality, although in certain cases it 
initiates repressive control over the constitutionality. The decisions which are adopted by the 
highest (supreme) court in this model have an erga omnes effect.  
 
3. "Austrian" (continental) model for protection of constitutionality and legality. 
This model is based on the 1920 Kelzen theory. According to this theory, there is a mutual 
dependence between the principle of supremacy of the Constitution from one, and the 
principle of supremacy of the Parliament from the other side. The constitutional issues, 
according to this model, are reviewed and resolved by a separate, specialised body called 
Constitutional Court, whose composition includes judges who are qualified to decide on 
constitutional matters3,  or by the highest regular courts4, or by the special boards within the 
regular courts that work exclusively on constitutional matters in a separate procedure. The 
decisions that are adopted by these courts have an erga omnes effect, regardless if it is a 
matter of preventive or repressive control of the constitutionality, i.e. legality. According to 
Kelzen, the specialised body that will protect the constitutionality and legality in a given 
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country ought to include independent persons (individuals), most often university professors 
in constitutional law, who will be able most objectively to assess if the laws that are adopted 
by the Parliament are in accordance with the Constitution of the country. For Kelzen, the 
Constitutional Court ought to act as a "negative legislator" that is authorised to annul or 
terminate the laws or some of their parts that are not in accordance with the supreme legal 
act.5  
 
4. Combined (American-Continental) model. This model has elements both from 
the widespread and from the concentrated system with wide authorities of the constitutional or 
supreme courts6. 
 
5. French (continental) model. This model is based on the French Constitutional 
Council from 1958, where resolving of constitutional issues is under the competence of 
separate bodies (constitutional councils) or under the competence of specialised chambers 
within the supreme courts7. 
 
2. The model of protection of legality and constitutionality in the Republic of Macedonia 
 
The 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia accepts the European 
(continental) model of protection of constitutionality and legality because this protection is 
provided by a specialised body, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia, which 
is a state body, and which, according to its status, does not fall under the system of division of 
power.  
The Constitution defines the position of the Constitutional Court, its composition, 
competence, functions and immunity of the judges, as well as the legal effect of its decisions. 
According to Article 113 of the Constitution, the manner of work and the procedure in front 
of the Constitutional Court is determined with an act of the Court8.  
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The protection of constitutionality and legality is not some kind of a state power, but 
an autonomous and independent function. The realisation of the competences of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia stands beyond the relations between the 
holders of the legislative and the executive government.  
Hence, the Constitutional Court is one of the key factors for the implementation of the 
Constitution. It is this court that analyses the process of construction and realisation of the 
relations between the two governments, as defined in the Constitution. This body, same as all 
other constitutional bodies, represents a constitutional institution whose main functions and 
scopes of work are determined in the Constitution and are in function of their realisation. This 
position of the Constitutional Court guarantees that the conditions for fulfilment of the 
constitutional-judicial function are already protected form any influence from the holders of 
the political power. 
But, from the other side, the constitutional status of the Court enables it to distance 
itself from the political authorities while performing its constitutional-judicial function, 
because the Court has a continuous and stable position when presenting its own independent 
position in time of change of the holders of the government. 
 
3. About the need of reforms of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia 
 
a) A need from a Law for the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia 
 
The fact that there is practically no country in the world that has a Constitutional Court 
in its system that is not regulated with a law, or a constitutional law, above all, the statutory 
matters related with the constitutional court, opens the issue whether there is a need from this 
kind of a law in the Republic of Macedonia. This need is obvious. The experience of other 
countries shows that regulating of the status, organisation and the competences of the 
Constitutional Court must be organised with a separate law or by a separate constitutional 
law, due to the meaning and the character of these matters in the constitutional and legal 
system of the country9.  
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The law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia will help in 
increasing the quality of defining the matters concerning the court which are currently 
regulated with an act (Rules of procedure) of the Court.  
 
b) Change of the manner of nomination and the manner of election of the constitutional 
judges in the Republic of Macedonia 
 
The system of nomination and appointment of constitutional judges must provide 
balance in order to guarantee independence from any political influence as well as 
independence of the judges, to guarantee high level of expertise and qualifications of the 
judges elected for this duty, to provide broad spectrum of knowledge, experience and culture 
in the court, and political sensibility which should in any case undermine the independence 
and impartiality of the judge.  
The need of greater inclusion of experienced judges in the Constitutional Court or 
recognised and distinguished retired judges form the Supreme court or from the appellate 
courts who have broad experience in executing their judicial functions represents a good 
model for reforming the composition of the Constitutional Court. Also, the need of inclusion 
of distinguished university professors in law in the composition of the Constitutional Court 
will enhance the role of this very important body. The need of demanding greater professional 
qualifications in the process of election of constitutional judges as well as the long-year 
experience in the field of the law also represents a very important criterion for election of 
constitutional judge.  
Comparative analysis of the election of the constitutional judges reveals that there are 
two main systems of appointment of constitutional judges, plus an additional, combined 
model, which represents a combination of the previous two.  
The first system is the system of direct appointment, whereat no election procedure 
is involved (for example, the system applied in Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Norway, Sweden, turkey and other countries.) this system can be divided on two subgroups.  
For the first subgroup, the power of appointment is a discretionary right of a given 
institution (France, Lithuania, Turkey). In France, thee appointment of constitutional judges is 
equally divided among three judges who are appointed by the President of the State, the 
Senate and the National Assembly. In Lithuania, the President of the country, the Parliament 
and the Supreme Court appoint per three judges each. The President of Turkey appoints the 
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judges of the Turkish Constitutional Court, but on a special quota of candidates coming from 
specific legal professions.  
 
For the second subgroup, the power of nomination of candidates for constitutional 
judges is related with previously submitted proposals coming from other bodies (the prime 
ministers of Sweden, Finland, Sweden, Ireland). For example, the Republic of Ireland has a 
special advisory board for judicial appointments whose recommendations must be taken into 
consideration when constitutional judges are appointed. In Finland, the Constitutional Court 
itself proposes candidates for future judges, and the president of the state appoints the new 
judges based on prior consultations with the minister of justice and the Council of Ministers.  
The second system is the electoral system, which is considered as more 
democratic than the previous one. The election of constitutional judges is most often 
executed by the parliament (the case of Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, Germany and 
others.) In the case of Germany, the Bundestag elects only one-half of the constitutional 
judges in an indirect manner, i.e. through the Committee for judicial appointments, which is 
proportionally composed of members of the Bundestag. In Portugal, ten of the permanent 13 
judges are elected by the Parliament. The difference in the electoral systems that exist in 
different countries is in which institution nominates the constitutional judges. The proposals 
can come from the president of the country (Slovenia, Azerbaijan), the upper house of the 
parliament (Croatia), combined proposal from the parliament, the executive government and 
the supreme court authority (Latvia), or the judicial council (like in the case of the Republic of 
Macedonia), or the proposals can come form the parliamentary political parties 
(Lichtenstein10.) 
The third system is the so-called hybrid system, which represents a combination 
of the previous two.  
This system is most common and has developed several alternative types. In some 
countries, the electoral element can have equal weight as the element of appointment (the case 
of Austria), but most often the electoral component is more important than the appointment 
(the case of Albania, Armenia, Romania, Spain and other countries). With the hybrid system, 
the authorities that nominate constitutional judges, such as the judicial bodies or the judicial 
councils, can also directly appoint judges (the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Italy 
and other countries).  
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It is believed that the system in which the election of the constitutional judges does not 
depend only on one segment of the state authority, i.e. the system where all segments of the 
state authority (legislative, executive and judicial) are involved in the election of 
constitutional judges is the most democratic system which has the highest level of legitimacy. 
The second system includes those countries in which the parliament is the only body 
that elects constitutional judges, and the decision for their appointment is adopted by qualified 
majority of members of parliament, i.e. with the same majority needed for amending the 
Constitution11. In this respect, there are three main models in the election of constitutional 
judges: monocratic, majority and supermajority model.  
Therefore, according to the majority of theoreticians, the best manner for election of 
constitutional judges is when all three segments of the government (legislative, executive and 
judicial) are equally involved in the process of election of the constitutional judges. Also, the 
duration of their mandate is also a very important segment for the election of the judges. The 
constitutional judges usually have much longer mandate, without the right to re-election. 
Mandate of nine years is most common, as well as the provision for one-third of the judges to 
be replaced on every third year.  
 
c) Determining responsibility for the work of the constitutional judges 
 
The main principle on which the constitutional democracy is based upon is the 
principle of responsibility for all segments of the government, and especially for the judicial 
government. Having in mind the importance of the Constitutional Court as a state body in the 
Republic of Macedonia, it is easy to note the necessity of determining a higher level of 
responsibility for the constitutional judges, especially since they have the power to annul or 
cancel laws that have been adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia as a house 
of representatives of all citizens of the country.  
In many east and central European countries, there are considerations for the need of 
removing the absolute power of the constitutional courts to perform abstract control of the 
constitutionality of the laws, and to introduce broader model of assessing the constitutionality. 
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Also, in some countries, there is a possibility for non-applying of the decisions of the 
constitutional courts and these decisions to become subject of assessment by the house of 
representatives if qualified majority of representatives ask for this. For example, the Polish 
Parliament can annul the decisions of the constitutional court with two-third majority of votes 
from the MPs, i.e. with the same majority of MPs needed for constitutional amendments. This 
system allows the legislator to annul the decisions of the constitutional court in order to 
protect its policy in a situation when the constitutional court is becoming too involved in the 
process of policy making. The same is happening in Romania, where the Parliament can annul 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court if that initiative is supported by two-third majority of 
the MPs in both houses of representatives12.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
There is a stance in the constitutional theory that the Constitutional Court has 
important functions in the consolidation and harmonisation of the democratic government in a 
given country. The Constitutional Court plays an important role in the "reviving" of the 
highest legal act in the country as an act that shapes and directs the political government. 
However, it is a fact that not all constitutional courts can achieve this goal. Some of them 
become powerless structures when facing the power of the executive and the legislative 
government, some fail to win the respect of the public because they are becoming "dictators" 
of what the executive and legislative government ought to do, thus becoming "hidden 
politicians" who deny the will of the citizens.  
 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia has a need of essential 
reforms, both in regard to the manner of nomination, as well as in regard to the manner of 
appointment of the constitutional judges, as well as legal regulation of the statutory matters of 
the Constitutional Court. There is also a need of introduction of a new processing instrument 
for protection of the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, both 
regarding the responsibility of the constitutional judges for their work, the qualifications and 
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professionalism of the constitutional judges, their mandate and the process of replacement of 
one-third of the composition of the Constitutional Court every third year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
